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I
INTRODUCTION
The state enterprises of new China, which are also called enterprises
owned by all the people, were established primarily through confiscation of
bureaucratic capital and enemy property,' and by redeeming and reforming
capitalist industry and commerce. By 1956, China had set up a socialist public
ownership system led by the state-run economy. In the more than thirty years
since the founding of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"), Chinese state-
run enterprises have developed continuously as economic construction has
unfolded. By 1985, the output value of state-run enterprises had reached
70.4 percent of China's industrial output;2 retail sales of commodities by
state-run commercial enterprises had reached 40.4 percent of the total; 3 the
fixed assets of all state-run enterprises amounted to 737.05 billion yuan. 4 The
total number of state-run industrial enterprises in the country is 90,700. 5 The
8,285 large and medium sized enterprises account for 2 percent of the total
number of industrial enterprises and 43 percent of the industrial output value,
and through their profits and taxes, 42.7 percent of the state's income. 6
Because of this, the authors hold that the state-run enterprises are the basis of
China's socialist economy and the main economic lifeline of the country.
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1. As early as October 1947, the Chinese Communist Party published The Manifesto of the
People's Liberation Army, which called for "the confiscation of the property of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang
Kaishek), of Song Ziwen (Mme. Jiang Jieshi's brother), of Kong Xiangxi (Song Ziwen's brother-in-
law), of Chen Lifu and his brother (Jiang's chief ideologists), and of the other chief war criminals, and
the confiscation of bureaucreatic capital." In February 1951, the Central Government promulgated
the directive on the confiscation of the property of war criminals, Chinese collaborators, bureaucratic
capitalists, and counter-revolutionary elements. Accordingly, within a short period after the
establishment of the People's Republic of China ("PRC") in 1949, the factories, banks, mines, stores,
and other businesses that had originally belonged to the Nationalist government and bureaucratic
capitalists were confiscated and changed into state run enterprises. At that time, this sort of
enterprise constituted about 80% of the fixed capital in industry, transportation, and light industry.
2. See 3 ZHONGGUOJINGJI NIANJIAN (CHINA'S ECONOMIC YEARBOOK) 19.
3. Id. at 59.
4. Id. at 11.
5. Id. at 18.
6. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), Apr. 28, 1987, at 1.
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Because the important long-term task of Chinese civil law is to adjust the
property rights relations of the state-run enterprises, the property rights
system of the state-run enterprises has become an important issue in Chinese
civil law. This article will focus on the property rights system of the Chinese
state-run enterprise and will not address other issues concerning other types
of enterprises' property rights.
II
THE CHINESE PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEM OF STATE-RUN
ENTERPRISES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REFORM OF
THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM
The reform of the Chinese economic system began with the Third Plenum
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held at
the end of 1978. Before then, the property rights of state-run enterprises
essentially followed the Soviet model of the Stalin era. The basic
characteristics of this system were an emphasis on the centralized and unified
management of state-run enterprises by the state executive units from the
central government to various local governments. The enterprises
themselves had no independent property rights: The production tasks of
state-run enterprises were set by mandatory goals established by the central
government. All state-run enterprises, regardless of the appropriateness for
its particular situation, were to implement the plan; all the gains and expenses
are managed centrally by the state; all the profits of state-run enterprises are
submitted to the state. Moreover, even most of the depreciation expenses are
also submitted to and managed by the state; all the expenditures are covered
by the state and specific funds can be spent only on specific purposes and
cannot be adjusted. All raw materials needed by the state-run enterprises are
distributed by the state. All products are priced, bought, and sold by the
state. The state shoulders the losses and unlimited liabilities of state-run
enterprises. 7 Besides, things like the appointing and removing of the
management personnel, the organization of labor, the distribution of the
workers' earnings, technology innovation, and expansion are all decided by
the executive units in charge of the state government, and the enterprises
themselves have no power to make any decisions. 8 Under such a situation, the
enterprises have neither the status of legal personality nor independent
property rights. This property rights system results from our long neglect of
the objective existence of commercial economy and our view that socialist
economy is a natural result. Accordingly, the previous Chinese civil law
theory commonly held that since the property rights of the state-run
enterprises is the major content of the state ownership, the state itself is the
sole owner of state property. No other enterprises and institutions could be
7. XUE MUQIAO, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI ZHUYIJINGJI WENTI YANJIU (RESEARCH ON ISSUES IN CHINA'S
SOCIALIST ECONOMY) 192 (rev. ed. 1983).
8. SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH OF CHINA'S REFORM OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM, ZHONGGUO JINGJI
TIZHI GAIGEDE XIN MOSHI (NEw FORMS IN THE REFORM OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM) 186 (1984).
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regarded as the subject of the state ownership. 9 This is the so-called sole
theory of state ownership in the Chinese civil law. In addition, as state
ownership can be exercised or controlled only by the People's Republic of
China, no other enterprises or institutions have the right to exercise the
ownership rights of the state property.' 0 This is usually called the unification
theory of the state property. In fact, these theories denied the facts that state-
run enterprises should have their independent property rights and also
should have their independent position. Both fit the highly centralized
economic management system in China.
Enterprises are the cell of the social-economic formation. The vitality and
dynamics of a social-economy are directly decided by the vitality of an
enterprise, the key to which is its independent property rights. Under the
previous economic system, enterprises had no independent property rights.
Therefore, the state-run enterprises' property rights system is becoming the
obstacle to the vitality of enterprises and saps the vitality of what ought to be a
dynamic socialist economy. The main shortcomings of this property rights
system are discussed below.
(1) The direct exercise of ownership rights over the property rights of state-run
enterprises by state organs mixed together the property rights relations and the
administrative relations between state and enterprise, thereby creating a situation in
which state and enterprise become indistinguishable and administrative methods
interfere in the production activities of the enterprises. This results in the ossification
of social-economic activities and curbs the vitality and vigor of enterprises.
(2) The direct exercise of ownership rights over state-run enterprises by government
organs led to the subordination of enterprises to the state government units, the
formation of localism in economic life, the blocking of horizontal economic
associations between enterprises, and the cutting of the links between the socialized
production and commodity economy. These elements in turn made professional
cooperation and exchange of funds, material, technology, and professionals among
enterprises and regions impossible, thereby causing unchecked construction,
duplicate production, and heavy financial losses for the state.
(3) The state's direct exercise of ownership rights and direct management of
enterprises caused serious uncontrolled investment. Investors did not care about the
return, and because enterprises have no independent property rights they naturally
neglected the gains and losses of their capital. On the one hand, enterprises
competed for investment and became diseased with "investment-hunger." On the
other hand, nobody cared about the gains and losses of investment capital. Together,
these tendencies caused a dangerous surge in basic construction and diminished the
state's economic benefits.
(4) Because the state directly exercises ownership rights and directly manages
enterprises, the government assumed the responsibility for profits and losses
generated by the enterprises' production activities. As a result, the enterprises did not
feel the pressure of competition and lazily became habituated to the security of the
'iron rice bowl" and the "one big pot." Meanwhile, because the enterprises handed
over to the state every penny they earned, and lacked a particular material interest,
they did not have the ability to assume obligations. Since there was a great gap
between on the one hand, the behavior of the enterprises, and on the other the
material interests of the enterprises, the zeal, initiative, and creativity of the employees
9. TONG Rou, ZHAO ZONGFU & ZHENG LICHUN, MINFA GAILUN (INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAw) 97-
98 (1982).
10. TONG Rou, MINFA YUANLI (BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAw) 159 (1986).
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and the enterprises were greatly depressed. The resources of the state could not be
fully utilized, and there was no possibility for realizing maximum economic efficiency.
The disadvantages of the former state-owned enterprise property rights
system have already curtailed the enhancement of the social productivity of
our country and slowed down the development of the national economy.
Thus, since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee (in
1978), the Party and state have launched a gradual reform of the economic
structure that has been pursued in an orderly, step-by-step, planned manner.
In respect to the economic reform in the cities, the key is the invigoration of
the enterprises, the core of which is to expand the autonomy of the
enterprises. 1
In order to implement the policy of the Party to expand the autonomy of
the enterprises, the State Council promulgated in July 1979 five important
legal documents: The Regulations on the Expansion of Operational
Management Autonomy for State-Owned Industrial Enterprises;' 2 The
Regulations on Retention of Profits by State-Owned Enterprises;' 3 The
Provisional Regulations on Levying Fixed Capital Tax in State-Owned
Enterprises; 14 The Provisional Regulations on Acceleration of Depreciation of
Fixed Capital for State-Owned Enterprises and Improvement of the Usage of
the Depreciation Fund;' 5 and The Provisional Regulations on Adoption of
Loan and Credit Methods for Floating Capital in Industrial Enterprises.1 6
The five documents have provided important legal guidelines for the reform
of the property rights system in state-owned enterprises, and thus caused
significant changes in the system. The following are the major changes:
First, enterprises now have certain rights in planning and managing
production. Once they have met the prerequisite of fulfilling the state plan,
enterprises may make a supplementary production plan, based on the
availability of energy and raw materials, to meet the needs of construction and
the demands of the market. The enterprises can also sell the products
manufactured under the supplementary plan on their own at the price
regulated by the state. When there is a surplus of production capacity, the
enterprises can undertake cooperative production for other enterprises,
making products for other enterprises with materials supplied by those
enterprises.
Second, enterprises can now retain a portion of the profits they make.
When the enterprise has made profits, a portion, stipulated by regulation,
may be retained. The enterprise can use the retained profit to establish funds
for production development, collective welfare, and employee bonuses. The
11. CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, GUANYU JINGJI TIZHI GAIGE
(RESOLUTION ON REFORM OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM) 12.
12. Guanyu kuoda guoying qiyejirngying guanli zizhu gaige ruogan guiding.
13. Guanyu guoying qiye shixing lirun liuchengde guiding.
14. Guanyu kaizheng guoying gongyeqiye guding zichanshuide zanxing guiding.
15. Guanyu tigao guoying gongyeqiye guding zichan zhejiu he gaijin zhejiufei shiyong banfade
guiding.
16. Guanyu guoying gongyeqiye shixing liudong zijin quan'e xindai zanxing guiding.
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larger the profits, the more the enterprise can keep. Hence, there is to a
certain degree a link between the performance and development of the
enterprise and the material interest of the employees.
Third, the depreciation rate has been accelerated. Most of the fund
accumulated through depreciation can be retained by the enterprises, while
the rest of it can be used by the enterprise's supervisory department in other
related subordinate enterprises.
Fourth, enterprises now have to pay to the state a tax on fixed capital they
possess. It is a system of paying for the possession and use of fixed capital.
Accordingly, the enterprises have the right to transfer or lease the surplus
fixed capital.
Fifth, all floating capital the enterprises need will be provided by banks
through the form of loans, with the enterprises paying interest for using
floating capital.
Sixth, enterprises now have the right to apply to central or local authorities
to export their own products. Part of the foreign exchange earned through
export can be retained according to the relevant state regulation. The
retained foreign exchange can be used by enterprises to import necessary
technology, equipment, and material or to send personnel abroad to study or
receive training.
Seventh, according to the regulations, no unit or individual has the right to
appropriate funds from enterprises except where there is an explicit
authorization from the relevant authorities, nor can those units or individuals
remove personnel, equipment, material, or capital from the enterprises.
Since implementation of the method of retention of profit and
responsibility for losses, the property rights of enterprises have improved
significantly. Although there have been changes, the enterprise property
right still is not guaranteed because the enterprise has not freed itself from
the interference of various supervisory administrative organs, which at each
level deduct a relatively large share of the profits. To overcome this
shortcoming, the state has undertaken two steps since 1983 to change the way
enterprises retain profits. The first step was to implement the method,
"Substitute tax for profits; maintain both tax and profits." In April 1983, the
state promulgated Implementation Rules on Converting State-Owned
Enterprise Profit Submission into Taxation' 7 and Temporary Regulations on
Levying Ownership Tax on State-Owned Enterprises.' The second step is to
change the method of making a combined payment of profits and taxes to the
state into one in which the enterprise pays taxes according to a schedule of
eleven stipulated types of taxes. After paying taxes, the enterprises can
allocate the profit according to their needs. To accomplish this, the state
promulgated Second Stage Provisional Rules on Converting State-Owned
Enterprise Profit Submission into Taxation and Regulations Regarding
17. Guanyu dui guoying qiye zhengshou suodeshuide zanxing guiding.
18. Guanyu zai guoying qiye tuixing ligaishui di'erbu gaigede baogaode tongzhi.
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Income Taxes for State-Owned Enterprises of the People's Republic of China
(Draft) in September 1984.19 With the implementation of the second step,
the state revenue formerly generated through both profits and taxes remitted
by the enterprises has been changed into a single tax resource. Now that
enterprises that have paid their taxes to the state have more power to manage
their property and finances, the material conditions have been created for the
enterprise truly to separate the functions of administrative organ and
entrepreneurial entity.
When implementing this change from submission of profits to payment of
taxes, the State Council promulgated in April 1983 The Provisional
Regulations on State-Owned Enterprises20 and in May 1985 the State Council
promulgated The Provisional Regulations Regarding Further Expansion of
the State-Owned Enterprises' Autonomy. 2' Furthermore, in 1985 the State
Council promulgated The Provisional Regulations to Enhance the Vigor of
Large- and Medium-Size State-Owned Industrial Enterprises, 22 and in 1986 it
promulgated The Regulations Regarding Encouraging Horizontal Economic
Cooperation. 23 The promulgation of these regulations has brought about
new changes to the enterprises' property rights system:
(1) Former laws and regulations recognized only the rights of enterprises to possess,
to utilize, and to profit from the property the enterprises occupied. There was little
right to dispose of the property. According to the new regulations, enterprises can
have broader rights to dispose of the property in two respects: first, the right to
dispose of the fixed capital property. In accord with the relevant regulations,
enterprises can lease or transfer, in return for compensation, the surplus set capital
property. If those properties include advanced and sophisticated equipment that is
under the direct control of superior departments, authorization should be obtained at
the time of transfer or lease. The income from transfer or lease can be used to
upgrade the enterprise's technology or equipment. The enterprises can also
contribute machines and equipment they possess as investment when they engage in
cooperation with other units.
Second, the right to dispose of its floating capital. The profits retained by the
enterprise after taxes will be distributed per the proportions set by state regulations to
establish funds such as production development fund, new products trial production
fund, reserve fund, employee welfare fund and employee bonus fund. The remaining
profit can be disposed of at the enterprise's discretion. The enterprises can also use
the temporarily uncommitted production development funds for investment in joint
ventures, cooperation, compensation trade, and so forth.
Third, the right to dispose of commodities. Except for those products the state
does not allow the enterprise itself to sell, the enterprise can sell the portion of the
products that are retained by the enterprise under state plan, surplus products
resulting from increased production, new trial products, products that are not
procured under the plans by the commercial sales units, and inventory overstock. The
enterprise may also sell a stipulated portion of key products normally subject to
unified distribution by the state. It also has the right to set the price for those
industrial production materials that it sells on its own. The enterprise can also
transfer for compensation its inventions, technology improvements, and innovations
19. STATE COUNCIL, GUOYING QIYE DIERBU LIGAISHUI SHIXING BANFA (TRIAL RULES FOR THE
SECOND STAGE OF CONVERTING STATE ENTERPRISE'S PROFITS TO TAXES) 9.1984, art. 1.
20. Guoying gongyeqiye zanxing tiaoli.
21. Guanyu jinyibu kuoda guoying gongyeqiye zizhuquande zanxing guiding.
22. Guanyu zengqiang dazhongxing guoying gongyeqiye huoli ruogan wentide zanxing guiding.
23. Guanyu jinyibu tuidong hengxiang jingji lianhe ruogan wentide guiding.
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to other domestic enterprises, or, with permission from the relevant department at the
State Council, to apply for foreign patents, or to export those inventions abroad.
(2) The former laws and regulations did not allow mutual investment among
enterprises, or formation of new enterprises through mutual associations. According
to the new regulations, enterprises can voluntarily engage in horizontal economic
associations without the former restrictions of boundaries between regions,
departments, and industries. The difference between state ownership and collective
ownership will no longer hinder cooperation between different enterprises. One may
implement affiliations for specialization, or for personnel, resources, capital,
technology, or even for sales. If the enterprises involved in associations use original
factory buildings, facilities and technology, patents, or trade marks as shares of
investment, their monetary value will not be calculated as part of the fixed capital
allowed by the state plan. The joint organization's internal production construction
and material distribution quotas can be accounted for by the two parties. In financing,
it is allowed now for the specialized banks to make fixed capital loans across regions
and specialties to those economic cooperation organizations, provided that the loans
would not exceed the scale or amount of fixed capital investment regulated by the
state plan. Loans obtained can be put into internal mutual investment. Floating
capital loans can be obtained through direct channels the enterprises are formally
assigned to, or can be adjusted through coordination among the parties involved.
There shall be no double taxation for such cooperation, and state-owned enterprises
will not pay an adjustment tax for profits generated from the cooperation. For five
years, profits resulting from investment in transportation, energy industry, or
investment in poor, isolated, inland rural regions would be subject to only half of the
usual income tax rate. Profits reinvested in these regions and industries would be
exempted from taxation. These measures affirm the right of the enterprise to allocate
both fixed and movable property.
It ought to be noted that although the regulations promulgated by the
administrative organs of the state during the economic reform have enriched and
improved Chinese civil law's enterprise property right system, these regulations are
administrative laws in nature. They are flexible rather than stable. In particular, these
enactments have not, or cannot, affirm the legal status of the enterprise in a society of
commodity economy. Without resolving this status, enterprises' property rights and
liabilities are incomplete in a legal sense.
In order to consolidate the achievement of the economic reform and to
promote the development of socialist commodity relationships in China, the
Fourth Session of the Sixth People's Congress enacted The General Principles of
Civil Law on April 12, 1986. The Standing Committee of the Sixth People's
Congress in December, 1986 passed the State Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.2 4
The promulgation of these two important civil law codes has clarified the legal
status of state-owned enterprises and set forth the property liabilities for
state-owned enterprises. Article 41 of the General Principles provides that
"state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises that meet the capital
requirements provided by the state, possess a charter, an organizational
structure and premises, and are able to assume civil obligations
independently, acquire the status of legal person upon approval and
registration by the responsible agency."
The General Principles also provides in article 48 that "the state-owned
enterprise legal person bears civil liability to the extent of the property the
State has given it to operate and manage." This means that after the state-
24. As per its article 43, the Bankruptcy Law went into effect on a trial basis three months after
the promulgation of the State Enterprise Law on Aug. 1, 1988.
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owned enterprise obtains status as a legal person, the property in the
enterprise has been separated from the property of the state and is distinct as
well from the property of the member/employees of the enterprise. The
enterprise has thus gained the property that is subject to its independent
management. In regard to the property it owns, the enterprise has the right
to possess, utilize, profit from, and dispose of it. Without an independent
property right, it is hard for an enterprise to become a true legal person.
It is noteworthy that even though the General Principles has stipulated that
the state enterprise, in its capacity as legal person, enjoys independent
property rights and can bear civil liabilities, these provisions are not
completely reflected in the provisions in the General Principles regarding the
ownership rights to property. In other words, there is an inconsistency
between the rules regarding the state enterprise's property rights and the
rules regarding the state enterprise's status as a legal person. The General
Principles provides in article 82 that "the right enjoyed by a state-owned
enterprise to operate according to law state property that has been given to it
to operate and manage is protected by law." The provision means that
enterprises have the right to the management of the property rather than the
right to the ownership. Moreover, the General Principles stipulates that the
state grants management right to the enterprise. Consequently, it is easy for
this sort of right to become a property right subordinate to the administrative
rights of the state, one administrative organs can now restrict, now loosen. 25
In respect to its content and scope, the enterprise's property management
right is unstable. The actual experience of the reform in recent years shows
that though enactments have defined the enterprise's rights, those rights have
been curtailed by various levels of local government and supervisory
administrative organs. "Loosening control over enterprises in public,
tightening the control in private" became a commonplace phenomenon.
Every government department and "administrative company" 26 has excuses
for interfering with and levying exactions on enterprises. 27 The enterprises'
property rights have not been realized in practice, nor has their status as legal
persons been guaranteed.
25. See Wang Liming & Guo Feng, Guoyou qiye gufenhua yu guojia suoouquan de biange (Securitization
of State Enterprises and the Transformation of State Ownership Rights), in ZHONG QINGNIANJINGYING LUNTAN
(YOUNG AND MIDDLE AGED ECONOMISTS FORUM), No. 6 (1986).
26. Companies with an administrative character (xingzhengxing gongsi) were produced in the
course of the reform of administrative structure. Because of a reduction in administrative organs,
some productive units which are no longer allowed to identify themselves as part of a particular
administrative structure, call themselves a company, although in fact they remain part of an
administrative organization. These units are called companies with an administrative character.
27. Wang Liming & Guo Feng, Guoyou qiye gufenhua yu guojia suoyouquan (The Securitization of State
Enterprises and the State's Ownership Rights), in JINGYING GUANLIZHE (MANAGERS), No. 12 (1986).
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III
DISCUSSION OF THE NATURE OF ENTERPRISE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CHINA AND THE VIEWPOINT OF THE AUTHORS
While the state has undertaken the reform of expanding enterprises'
autonomy, there has been broad discussion among Chinese jurists on the
nature of enterprise property rights in the state-owned enterprises. The
issues are: Why does the enterprise have the rights to possess, use, profit
from, dispose of the property granted to its control by the state? What is its
theoretical basis? Under the demands of economic reform, what are the
appropriate rights required by the enterprises, in regard to the property in
their possession to meet practical needs?
A. The Doctrine of Right to Possession
This theory recognizes that the state has the ownership right to the
property in the state-owned enterprises while the enterprises have the right to
possession. 28 This theory is based on Karl Marx's analysis of feudal land
ownership. In commenting on the feudalist landlord economy, Marx said:
"[T]he direct producer was not the owner but was the possessor, and all his
labor under the law in fact belonged to the owner of the land." 2 9 Under the
feudal system, when tenants cultivated the land, the ownership of the land and
the possession of the land were in fact separated. The possessor of the land
did not have the ownership of the land but the right to possession as if the
land belonged to him. That is to say, the tenant had all the rights other than
the right to dispose of the land. The right to possession was derived from the
authorization of the land owner. Under this Marxist doctrine, it is the task of
the economic reform to provide enterprises with comprehensive property
rights so long as the means of production are owned by the state. The state,
as the owner of the property, would have the final disposition right to the
property, but at the same time enterprises as the possessor would have
substantial allocation rights over the property of the owner-that is, the right
to possession. Therefore, the right to possession is a relative or indirect
ownership right.
Having recognized the disadvantages of the over-centralization of power
in the Chinese economic system, this doctrine advocates that enterprises
should be given a right to possession which would be separated from the state
ownership. This is a correct starting point. However, as the doctrine derives
its analogy from feudal natural economic conditions which had the feature of
personal adherence to the land, it is not satisfactory to explain the total
relationship of rights and liabilities in socialist commodity production
28. See Jiang Ping, Kang Deguan & Tian Jianhua, Guojia you guoying qiye zhyiande caichan guanxi
yingshi suoyouquan hejanyouquan de guanxi (The Property Relationship Between the State and State Enterprises
Must be a Relationship Between Property Right and Usufruct, in FAXUE YANJIU (STUDIES IN LAw), No. 4
(1980); Meng Qngguo, Lun zhanyou zhanyouquan gongneng he zhanyou quan, (On Possession, Function of
Possession Right, and Possession Right), in FAXUE YANJIU (STUDIES IN LAw), No. 2 (1985).
29. 3 K. MARX, ZIBENLUN (CAPITAL) 893.
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activities. Furthermore, the doctrine miscomprehended the concepts of
possession and "right to possession." Possession rights are in fact one of the
functions stemming from ownership rights. "Since the possession right is one
of the functions separated from ownership, it cannot exceed the scope it
inherently has." 30 To conceptualize one function of ownership right as a
relative ownership right will be logically absurd.
B. The Doctrine of the Right to Operative Management (jingying guanli
quan)
This theory holds that the state has the right to own the property but the
enterprise has the operative management right. The theory was first
presented by the famous jurist and member of the Soviet Academy of Science,
Wynijilatov, in his book The Ownership Right in Socialist Countries in 1948. Stalin
quoted this concept when he was writing his 1950 book, The Soviet Socialist
Economy. The concept was adopted formally in Soviet Civil Legislation
Principles and the Soviet Russia Civil Code in 1961 and 1964, respectively.
East European countries have adopted such a concept or developed it in
different ways. For instance, the Hungarian Civil Code used the term
"management right," and the Czechoslovak Economic Code used the term
"the right to management of people's property," and so on. Article 82 of the
General Principles is in fact recognition of the state enterprise's right of
management. In China, many scholars support this concept 3' which is clearly
consistent with current legislation.3 2
This theory holds that the object of the management right is that of
property, that is to say, enterprises can directly exercise the right to possess,
utilize, and dispose of the property. Enterprises can benefit from the property
through operative management. This right is derived from and depends on
the state's right of ownership. Moreover, the scope of the functions of the
right and the limits of the right have been prescribed by the state as the right
holder of the ownership. Such a management right is a derivative right cast
by the owner onto the property and is inferior to the state ownership.
33
The authors' view is that the concept of an operative management right or
the right to operate has confused the management right of the administrative
30. Wang Liming & Li Shirong, Quanmin suoyouzhi qiye guojia suoyouquan wenti tanlun (An Inquiry
into Problems in State Property Rights in Enterprises Owned by the Whole of the People), in ZHONGGUO SHEHUI
KEXUE (CHINESE SOCIAL SCIENCE), No. 1 (1986).
31. WANG BAOSHU & CUi QINZHI, GONGQIYE FA LUNGANG (ON THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE LAW)
40-41 (1985).
32. Some scholars argue that in the General Principles the right of operation (ingying quan) is not
equivalent to the right of operative management (ingying guanli quan). "If the two sorts of rights are
not separated, then inevitably the enterprise is the same as a level of administrative management
(xingzheng guanli) and the enterprise becomes an appendage of the administrative organization
(xingzheng jiguan). " See Tong Rou & Zhou Wei, Lun guoying qiye guanti quan (A Discussion of the
Management Right of State Enterprises), in FAXUE YANJIU (STUDIES IN LAW), No. 3 (1986). In our view, the
operation right and the administrative right are both obtained from adminsitrative grants of power,
so in fact there is no difference between the two.
33. See WANG BAOSHU & CUI QINZHI, GONGYE QIYEFA LUNGANG (ON THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE
LAW) 41-42 (1985).
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organ with the enterprise's property right. This concept treats the
enterprise's right as a product of authorization from an administrative organ.
It militates against the separation of administrative organs and enterprise
entities and is unresponsive to the demands of the reform. Furthermore, if
the enterprise's property right is not recognized as a right necessary for the
enterprise as producer and manager of commodities, enterprises would not
be able to obtain a stable, well defined right to the property. In particular, if
the enterprise enjoyed only the operative management right or the operative
right, there would hardly be normal commercial exchanges between state-
owned enterprises and collectively-owned enterprises. For instance, when
such a transaction is undertaken, the state-owned enterprises could only
transfer the operative management right over commodities, yet the collective
could transfer the ownership right. When there is a horizontal cooperation in
production, the state enterprises can invest in the cooperation only the right
of operation but the collectives could use their ownership right to generate
the capital. It would be absurd both in theory and in practice. If we recognize
only the right of operation but not the right to ownership, it would be very
hard to explain why state enterprises should bear the risk of bankruptcy when
the enterprises could not balance their deficit with their capital.3 4
C. The Doctrine of Trust in Management
This theory holds that the state is the owner of the property but cannot
directly manage the property. Based on its own interests and needs, the state
can give the property to another person to manage and operate. When the
state decides to entrust property owned by the people to the trustee
(enterprise) to manage, and the trustee accepts the trust, the relationship
between the state and the enterprise has become a relationship of trustor and
trustee. The trustor has the right to give trust to the trustee to manage the
property and the trustee has the right to manage the property as the trust
relationship so describes.3 5
These authors maintain the view that the doctrine of trust management is
trying to explain the relationship between the state and the enterprise as an
equal civil relationship while denying that the enterprise property right is
based on an authorization from an administrative organ. However, it is
obvious that this doctrine is derived from the common law trust system, one
inappropriate for relations between the state and enterprises. Because the
enterprise is established by the state, it cannot exist totally independently of
the state. In the period before the ownership rights and administrative rights
enjoyed by the state are separated, there will still be the appearance of a state
with a dual identity as owner and administrative organ. It will be hard to
34. See Wang Liming, Lun shangpin suoyouquan (On Commodities Ownership), in FAXUE YANJIU
(STUDIES IN LAw), No. 2 (1986).
35. Jin Ping & Chao Yongshan, Guojia caichan quan yu weituojingyingquan (The State's Property Rights
and the Right to Entrust Management Right), in ZHONGGUO FAXUE (CHINA'S JURISPRUDENCE), No. 4
(1985); Zhao Wanyi, Lun weituo jingying quan (On the Entrusting of Management Right), in GuojIA
SUOYOUQUAN LUNWENJI (COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE STATE'S OWNERSHIP RIGHT) (1987).
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maintain an equal civil relationship between the state and the enterprise.
Furthermore, there are no clear theoretical explanations as to whether the
assigner of operational right (trustor) and the receiver of that right (trustee)
are rights of obligation or of property.
D. The Doctrine of Usufruct (The Right of Beneficial Use of Property)
The theory holds that the state has the ownership right in state enterprise
property, but the enterprise has usufruct. 36 Pinning the shortcomings of the
situation in China on the fact that enterprises do not have an economic
interest in the property and suffer too much interference from administrative
organs, this theory treats the enterprise's right in the property it is managing
as usufruct. Usufruct means that the non-owner of the property will get an
interest in utilizing and benefitting from the property as of right. The theory
holds that usufruct can be shown in several aspects: The state enterprise's
use right in the property is produced by the state's action of creating the
enterprise. Once the enterprise is established, it gains usufruct in the
property the state authorizes it to manage. Once usufruct is established, the
right of possession, use, and benefit will be transferred to the possessor of the
usufruct, that is, the enterprise. The enterprise will also have the right to
dispose the floating capital.
As owner, the state retains the ultimate right to recover the fixed capital
and the value of the floating capital. This is the right to withdraw property or
value as the owner of the property in its pure form. The state, based on its
sole ownership right over state enterprise property, has the right to plan the
production guidelines, issue the order of production plan, supervise the
production activities, and collect the value of depreciation of fixed capital.
The state also has the right to withdraw all fixed capital and floating capital
when the enterprise is closed down. As holder of the usufruct, the enterprise
has the right to conduct its production activities independently, and to
possess, utilize, and dispose of the floating capital in the enterprise. The
enterprise also has the right to allocate as it sees fit the post-tax profits it
retains.
The authors think that it is correct to regard usufruct as stressing the
economic realization of the state's ownership and the economic benefit the
enterprise ought to enjoy. However, it is still not satisfactory to summarize
the enterprise property right as simply another right in the traditional civil law
concept of usufruct. First, the enterprise's property right is not like usufruct,
for the enterprise cannot seek to benefit only itself from the state's property.
Also, even if usufruct is established, the state's ownership right cannot
become a "simple ownership right" or a "hollow right." Second, usufruct is
produced on the basis of contract. Its duration is limited, and the enterprise's
property right is established and diminished according to law. Its very
36. See Li Kaiguo, Guoying qiye caichan quan xingzhi tantao (An Inquiry into the Character of State
Enterprise Property Right), in FAXUE YANJIU (STUDIES IN LAW), No. 2 (1982).
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existence and continuation will depend on the demand of the society and the
outcome of the management of itself. There is no definite time requirement
in it. Third, usufruct cannot include all the competence embodied in the state
enterprise's property right. The enterprise's exercise of property rights is not
limited only to profit but includes the right of disposition of the property,
which traditional usufruct cannot ever contain. Therefore, the concept of
usufruct cannot explain the fact that the enterprise has a definite right to
dispose of state property.
E. The Doctrine of Total Ownership Right
This theory advocates abolishing the state's ownership right and turning
over enterprise property to enterprise ownership. With the preconditions
that enterprises shall abide by the law, guarantee the expansion and
accumulation of the enterprise property, and respect social interest, the
enterprise shall have the right to possess, utilize, and dispose of property as
independent owner of the property. The relationship between the state and
the enterprise becomes purely one of obligation. 37
The positive implication of the doctrine is that it can prevent
administrative interference from the state and realize the separation of
government and enterprise. It can also guarantee the role of the enterprise as
a producer and exchanger of commodities with the independent status of
legal person. However, China is a socialist country in which public ownership
plays the leading role in its economy. If state ownership is abolished,
enterprises would take properties as their own, and the property owned by
people would become "collectively owned." The state would no longer be
the subject of the ownership. There would be no macro-control over the
whole economy by the state through the legal system of ownership. It would
easily lead to spontaneous tendencies of decentralization and blindness in the
economy and disregard for the general interest.
The authors consider that given the goals of China's planned commodity
economy, the state enterprise, as a commodity producer, must be granted
necessary property rights. The enterprise must have the right to possess,
utilize, profit from, and dispose of the property. Under the theory of
Marxism, the precondition for the existence of a commodity economy is that
the producer consider itself as the commodity owner and as having an
ownership right in exchange, transfer, and acquisition. Therefore, if the
enterprise is not an owner, and does not enjoy jurisdiction over the
commodities produced, that is, the ownership rights of a legal person, then it
has no right to act as an exchanger of commodities with the status of legal
person, nor can it enter the sphere of exchange as a relatively independent
commodity producer. This is one aspect of the problem. Another aspect is
that the state enterprise that participates in the production and circulation of
37. Shen Meice, Lun qe faren suoyouquan (On the Ownership Right ofthe Enterprise Legal Person), in
GuojIA SUOYOUQUAN LUNWENJI (COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE STATE'S OWNERSHIP RIGHT) (1987).
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commodities may suffer losses, even to the point of bankruptcy. The
enterprise must then assume its obligations with the property at its disposal.
The reason that the enterprise can use its property to bear this liability is
because it acts as a legal person which owns the property. Thus, recognizing
that the socialist economy is a planned commodity economy, given that we
want to develop the socialist commodity economy, recognition of the state
enterprise as a legal person with the ownership rights of a legal person is
inevitable.
The authors consider that the rights to possess, use, and dispose that are
encompassed in the ownership right can, on the basis of the will and interests
of the owner, be separated from ownership. This is required for the
development of the commodity economy. These rights are the keys to
production, exchange, distribution, and sale. The enterprise lacks any sort of
competence to resolve the question of whether or not in production or
reproduction the enterprise can achieve the status of a relatively independent
producer and manager of commodities. Its role as a producer and manager of
commodities and its position in law as a legal person are imperfect.
Therefore, the so-called proper separation of state ownership refers to the
proper separation of all powers and functions and not just some. When the
enterprise enjoys various competencies, it already possesses the legal person
ownership right. This then safeguards the enterprise's status as legal person.
However, does it mean that the state ownership is abolished when the state
separates its ownership from various functions deriving from the ownership?
The authors hold that every function of the property right can be separated
from the right itself. And this does not mean the ownership right is
diminished. The reason is that aside from all functional rights dwelling in the
ownership, there is another abstract right, the right of control, which only
belongs to the owner. 38 After the various functions of ownership are
separated, the owner's right of control (zhipei quan), that is, the owner's
authority over the things, is not separated from the owner. The right of
dominance is perpetual because it belongs throughout to the owner.
Regardless of how long these functional rights are separated from the
ownership right, the separation is temporary; ultimately these rights reside in
the ownership right. Those who worry that once functional rights are
separated from ownership, the nature of state ownership in a socialist country
will change, do not understand how to protect and promote socialist public
ownership through means of law. Thus, we state again that recognition of the
ownership rights enjoyed by the enterprise legal person in no way negates the
ownership rights of the state.
What measure, if any, could be used to realize the goal of guaranteeing the
separation of legal capacity from ownership and allowing the state enterprise
to enjoy the ownership rights of legal person? The authors think that the
methods adopted in the reform such as leasing, responsibility system, or
38. Concerning the disputes on the right of control, see Wang Liming & Li Shirong, supra note
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capital responsibility system, cannot resolve the problem. Only gradual
implementation of a joint stock system can attain the goal. (See part three of
this article.) In China's current stage, a stock system can be implemented only
in the small and medium size state enterprises. The state must maintain
exclusive control and management of those large enterprises that affect the
national economy and livelihood. The state shall also have exclusive right to
their profits. The large enterprises could try the form of "one man company"
to restructure their organization. Under such reorganization, a large
enterprise would have only one stockholder, the state. In theory, however,
the property directly controlled by the state could be separated from the
property controlled by the enterprise. The enterprise would thus gain the
status of legal person and bear civil liability on its own. The investment risk
would thus be shifted to the enterprise from the state. Of course, our view is
not consistent with the current legislation. It awaits proof through practice. 39
IV
SEVERAL FORMS OF REALIZATION OF THE STATE ENTERPRISE
PROPERTY RIGHT
The aim of China's urban economic reform is to invigorate the enterprises.
The key in this process is to affirm and protect the enterprise's property right.
What sort of legal form should be adeopted to realize enterprise property
rights? Over the last several years theoretical and practical workers have
conducted a vigorous debate about this. Owing to the numbers and types of
Chinese enterprises, theory and practice have produced various legal forms.
A. Stock Equity
Some of the state-owned enterprises have divided the property into a
certain number of shares which could be bought by employees of the
enterprise, members outside of the enterprises, collective units, or
enterprises. The state has the controlling share. The form of stock equity has
changed the situation where the state was the sole owner of the property. The
new stock equity venture becomes a legal person, enjoying ownership right,
while the control of the state is realized through the stocks it holds. As the
owner of stock, the state has the right to profit from and dispose of it. Other
rights will be exercised by the enterprise.
Since the independent property ownership right is derived from owning
stock rather than from a unilateral administrative authorization by the state,
the state, even though it is majority shareholder can no longer directly
interfere with the operational activities of the enterprises. "The state can
exercise its influence only through its shareholder rights and board
39. According to article 4 of "The Provisional Regulations on Administration of Company
Registration" issued in 1985 by the State Council ("Gongsi dengji quanli zanxing guiding"), it is
forbidden to establish a one-person company.
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membership." 40 Thus, the right in property has become a stockholding right
rather than an administrative right. This relationship is one protected by law.
The right and liability in the property will be prescribed either by relevant
regulations or by-laws of the enterprises. The rights and duties between the
state as shareholder and the joint stock enterprise are thereby concrete and
legally guaranteed.
To what kind of enterprises could the form of stock equity be applied?
Some scholars hold that it is not applicable to large-scale enterprises that have
a vital role in the national economy, such as banks, railroads, telephone
companies, and postal services. But it could be applied to newly established
specialized banks, railway companies, power companies, and communication
companies. State owned large and medium enterprises can gradually
implement limited liability equity enterprises. Newly established large and
medium size enterprises ought all take the form of equity stock ventures.
Joint ventures with foreign investment ought all be stock equity with limited
liability. Other small scale enterprises are not well suited to adopt stock
equity. 4 ' Some other scholars, however, hold that the form of stock equity
should not be the direction of reform for Chinese large and medium size
enterprise. They hold that the stock system is for resolving contradictions
between socialized production and relatively dispersed capital, and between
various ownership forms. Under Chinese socialism,
the stock system could be used to collect capital by issuing stocks to the society to
expand production and upgrade the socialization process of individual or collective
enterprises. The large and medium size enterprises have already become publicly
owned property, or as Marx said, direct social property. It is hard to say that
becoming an equity system economy is economic progress. Therefore establishing
such a system cannot be considered a goal or direction of the reform. 4 2
In form, joint equity can realize the separation of ownership and management
rights and guarantee the independent property rights of the enterprise. Yet,
the system cannot effectively prevent state interference because as the largest
stockholder in the enterprise, the members of the board of directors
representing the interests of the state could select the chairman of the board,
appoint the officers, control the direction of policy, and decide the
management philosophy and allocation of resources. Under these
circumstances, because stock powers are essentially concentrated in the hands
of the state, not only would socialist large and medium scale enterprises not
benefit from the separation of state and enterprise, but the state would also
possibly have a legal basis for renewed interference in the enterprises'
economic vitalization. 4 3
40. Wan Yi'ning, Wo guo suoyouzhi gaige de shexiang (Tentative Thoughts on Reform of Our System of
Ownership), People's Daily, Sept. 26, 1986, at 5.
41. Id.
42. See Wu Shuqing, Gufenhua bushi guoyingdazhongxingqiyegage defangxiang (Securitization is not the
Direction of Enterprise Reform of Large- and Middle-Scale State Enterprises), People's Daily, Mar. 16, 1987, at
5.
43. Id.
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The stock equity system is a legal form that can serve to realize state
enterprises' property rights, but that ought to be conditionally applied to only
some. Still, generally speaking, among the various measures for perfecting
the system of state enterprise property rights, it is theoretically the most
possible. We consider that: (1) After an enterprise adopts the stock system,
the state's administrative organs would no longer exercise ownership rights
but would become organizations representing the will of the state and
implementing its administrative rights. The state may establish special
organizations to manage its equity interests and property in different
enterprises (something similar to holding companies in the west). The
institutions so established will have special reponsibility for the state's
property and investment profit from the stocks, and for appointing
representatives to the enterprises. The relationship between such institutions
and enterprises should be as equal subjects, a father/son-like subordinate
administrative relationship. This will encourage the separation of ownership
and administrative rights and permit government organizations to escape the
contradictions inherent in their dual functions. (2) After the state and some
other entities have invested capital into the enterprise, they would lose direct
control over the property but the enterprise would have the independent
right over the property. It would become truly an independent equity
enterprise legal person. (3) The stock equity system would cause the
enterprise and laborers to feel a high degree of responsibility toward the
property they occupy. Because stock equity absorbs part of its capital from
individual laborers, those individuals would have risk in the capital they
invested. The laborers, the enterprise, and the state are tied together on the
property in which to share the risks. "If one loses, everyone loses. If one
gains, everyone gains." It would change the state of mind for most of the
people who did not care about the profit of the enterprise, and did not pay
attention to the invasion of state property or waste of property. It could thus
promote the most efficiency in utilizing the property. (4) In the stock system,
the enterprise would no longer be able to get free use of capital and property
from the state. The venture would have a certain risk. The state, as an
investor, would have to care about the result/output of its capital. Whether
the state could get a good return depends on the management of each
enterprise. When an enterprise has a good rate of return, the state could put
more capital into the enterprise by acquiring more shares of the enterprise so
as to increase the amount of profit. For those enterprises that are ill-
managed, the state could pull out the investment, reduce the shares of the
stock, or transfer capital to the most needed places. In this way, state capital
is invested more reasonably. Stock enterprises remain a complicated issue,
and numerous questions await exploration. 44
44. See Wang Liming & Guo Feng, Guoyou qive gufenhua yu guojia suoyouquan (Securitization of State-
Owned Enterprises and the State's Ownership Rights), in GuoYou QIYE GUFENHUA Vt) GUOJIA SUOYOUQUAN DE
BIANGE (SECURITIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATE
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS).
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B. The Leasing System
In the leasing system, the state would act as a traditional lessor to lease the
enterprise to collectives, partnerships, or individuals. The lessor and one
lessee would interact with each other according to the leasing contract. The
state would not interfere with production activities, so long as they conformed
to the law, and under the provisions of the lease contract, the lessee would
have the independent right to possess, utilize, profit, and dispose of property
in the enterprise. Accordingly, the enterprise's independent property right is
directly embodied in the lessee itself. Such activity is the activity undertaken
by the enterprise as an independent legal person. The independent property
right is directly passed onto the lessee through the leasing contract. If the
state violated the provisions of the leasing contract and infringed on this
right, the enterprise could seek legal protection under the law. The leasing
system thus helps to establish the property right for the enterprise.
In practice, there is no clear unified regulation regarding the leasing
system for state-owned enterprises, and methods vary widely by locality. In
general, the current leasing system has several features. First, the whole
enterprise is the subject matter of the lease. The enterprise legal person's
property right is exercised by the lessee. The state cannot interfere with the
exercise of the property right. Second, the lessee implements the state plan
under the lease contract. The lessee also pays taxes to the state. The lessee
promotes the efficiency of the enterprise and develops the quality of the
enterprise so as to increase and strengthen its productivity. But the lessee
cannot change the direction of the enterprise without the authorization of the
state. Third, when the lessee assumes the lease, he must provide certain
security property as guarantee of completion of the contract's demands and as
compensation to the state for losses it might suffer as a consequence of
enterprise losses. However, since the lessee's economic strength is limited,
the security property may be less than the total value of the property that is
being leased. Fourth, leased enterprises are usually small industrial
enterprises or small to medium commercial enterprises. This is because given
lessees' limited ability to provide security, they lack the capacity to bear the
responsibility for a large-scale enterprise's deficits or for losses the state
would suffer from a bankruptcy. As a consequence, large and medium size
enterprises are not easy to be leased out.4 5
The leasing system provides a possible resolution to the problem of
enterprises' independent management of their property rights. It also
eliminates unjust interference from the state. It reasonably adjusts the
45. On the above method, one can consult Shenyang shi xiaoxing guoying qiye zulin jingying
guiding (Shenyang Municipal Proposed Regulations for Managment of Leasing of Small-Scale State
Enterprises; Beijing shih guoying (jiti) xiaoxing xiuli qiye zulin jingying shixing guiding (Beijing
Municipal Proposed Regulations for Management of Leasing of Small-Scale State and Collective
Repair Enterprises); Shanghai shi guanyu guoying xiaoxing he jiti shangye shipin fuwuye zulin
jingying shixing guiding (Shanghai Municipal Temporary Regulations on Several Questions
Concerning Management of Leasing of Small-Scale State and Collective Commercial, Food, and
Service Enterprises).
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distribution of interests between the state and the enterprise and creates the
possibility for the lessee to obtain a large profit and assume economic
obligations. Practice shows that the leasing system achieves fairly clear
economic benefits.
We think, though, that the leasing system has its own shortcomings: First,
in most of the cases, the lessee cannot bear the risks of unprofitable
management. In other words, the leasing system would be efficient only when
the enterprise is making a profit. If the enterprise were to run in the red, the
state would sustain most of the losses. However, such problems can be solved
by establishing a system of venture risk insurance. The coverage of such
insurance shall be that part of the property that is not guaranteed by the
security property provided by the lessee. The premium of such insurance
shall be shared by the enterprise and the lessee. The lessee's share of the
premium may be deducted from profits. The enterprise may pay for this
portion of the premium before the enterprise starts making profit. Thus, the
state can avoid losses to its property caused by the poor management of a
lessee with insufficient capital.
Second, the short range behavior by the lessee may be overemphasized.
Because the leasing system usually bases the reward to the lessee on annual
profit, it may stimulate a tendency for the enterprise to seek only short range
profit but disregard the longer range behavior within a limited lease period.
To prevent such short-sighted behavior, the authors think that the lease
contract should contain clear provisions on investment and improved
technology and that the final reward for the lessee should be determined on
the basis of the value of the property after the expiration of the leasing
contract.
Third, the relationship between the lessee and the employees of the
enterprise tends to be tense. This tension occurs because once the enterprise
is leased out, employees' wages and hours and pace of work are all decided by
the lessee. Since there are no determinate legal forms to control the lessee's
actions, it would be easy for the employees' interests to be harmed and the
relationship between the lessee and the employees to become tense. The
authors think that the way to resolve this problem is to use labor, specifically
labor contracts, to regulate the relationship between lessee and enterprise
employees on such matters as work assignment, wages, and safety. Violations
by either side would be dealt with according to law. In this way the lawful
rights and interests of the workers may be assured, and to an extent relations
between lessee and employees may be relaxed.
C. Forms of Responsibility Contract
The responsibility system is one in which the state contracts with the
enterprise for the enterprise to undertake a series of economic and technical
goals such as amount of profit, technical reform, new product development,
product quality, consumption of supplies, equipment utilization rate,
appreciation of fixed assets, efficiency of capital use, conditions for carrying
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out the plan, loan repayment, and production safety. The contract also
provides that the enterprise enjoys complete rights to possess, use, and
benefit from its property. The distinguishing feature of the responsibility
system is that proceeding from the distribution of rights and interests, the
enterprise obtains stipulated benefit once it has completed for the state the
economic and technological goals called for in the contract. Thus, the state
clearly and concretely embodies in the contract's provisions the economic and
technical goals within the contents of the enterprise's ownership rights, while
the state cannot interfere at will since within the stipulations of the contract
the enterprise enjoys complete autonomy in regard to its property.
Therefore, the responsibility system is the realization of the enterprise's
property rights through the signing of a responsibility contract by the state
and the enterprise.
Since responsibility contracts provide in concrete detail the economic and
technical goals which the enterprise should achieve and protect the interests
of both government and enterprise, such contracts play an active role in
increasing the energy and realizing the property rights of the state-owned
enterprise. Based on experimental units, the Chinese Government has spread
responsibility contracts in big and medium state-owned enterprises since
1987. However, because the circumstances of enterprises are not uniform,
various localities have adopted myriad types of contracts. Generally speaking,
though, there are three kinds:46
First, undertaking responsibility for progressively increasing payments. It
means that the base amount and proportional rate of increase are fixed for
several years. Its characteristics are: (1) The amount of profit paid to the
state is fixed; anything in excess is kept by the enterprise. (2) The contract
period is for several years. In exercising its property right, the enterprise
must remember to engage in overall planning. (3) Through hard work, the
enterprise can accumulate sufficient capital to develop new products and
modernize its technology. (4) Since the share of profit paid to the state is
fixed, the pressure and risk are great. This method requires the enterprise to
have a sales outlet for its products, and relatively stable market and outside
environment. So this system fits those companies with major responsibilities
for technological reform and strong ability to export, or with an urgent need
to develop, such as the Capital Iron and Steel Company and Number Two
Motor Vehicle Company.
Second, undertaking responsibility for fixed profit payments. This means
anything in excess of this amount is the enterprise's. The contract can be for
one or more years. This form of contract fits those companies which produce
products that are wanted by society but generate low profits. The enterprise
gets a sufficient profit, but the state's income is low so the scope of such
contracts should be restricted.
46. See Shijiejingji daobao (World Economic Herald), Apr. 27, 1987, at 13.
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Third, dividing the the profit surplus. It means that after the companies
hand in the required amount of profit, they can share the remaining benefit
with the government in a flexible period. With this kind of contract, both
government and enterprise are able to benefit from the surplus. It carries less
risk for both government and enterprise, and its applicable scope is relatively
broad.
In the process of implementing the responsibility system, there are some
places for improvement: how to calculate the enterprise's base value of
property and base production; how to have the responsibility goals reflect the
enterprise's interests. These economic issues can be resolved through gradual
exploration and should not affect the realization of the independent property
rights of enterprises. From the viewpoint of enterprise property rights, there
are also some problems which need to be discussed, such as who owns the
stipulated profit, and who has ownership if the companies use the excess
profit to buy fixed assets. Some people say the newly gained assets should
entirely or partly belong to the company; other people say they should belong
completely to the state. 47 The crucial question is how to determine the
ownership of profit itself. If the provisions of contract are applicable, all the
profit belongs to the enterprise and the ownership of the assets which are
produced through reinvestment of the profit by the enterprise also belong to
the same enterprise. But, the result of such a practice is that the whole assets
of the enterprise, many years later, will be divided into two parts: state-owned
assets and the enterprise's collectively owned assets. Furthermore, the
percentage of the latter will be increasing with the continuous expansion of
production. The result will change the basic nature of the ownership system
and conflict with the fundamental requirements of China's system of socialist
public ownership.
V
THE FORMS OF ASSET MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM
The asset management responsibility system is a combination of the
reform of the leadership system of enterprises and the social evaluation of
enterprise assets. It is a sort of legal form by which the enterprise's
independent property right and responsibility for results passes through
contract to the operator. 48 The details of the form are the following:
i. To select enterprise leaders on the basis of existing tangible and intangible assets.
The candidate assesses the potential productive ability of non-money capital and
assets. The person whose assessment is highest and whose qualifications are good will
be selected.
2. The competent organs of the state and the winning candidate negotiate, sign, and
have notarized a contract that stipulates the rights, obligations, and responsibilities
during the tenure of the candidate.
47. Id. at 14.
48. Hua Shengchou, Beigian jingide chonguin gouzau (Rebuilding of Alicroeconomics), JINGJI YANJIU
(ECoNoMIc RESEARCH), No. 3 (1986); Chengshi gaigede hexinshi zhidude genben biange (The Core of Economic
Reform is the Basic Transformation of the Enterpnse System), Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), July i4, 1987.
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3. The candidate has to provide certain personal property to mortgage the loss of
the capital and assets.
4. At the termination of the contract, the competent state organs reevaluate the
enterprise assets and determine any differences. If there is a profit, the operator, staff,
and workers are entitled to proportionate bonuses according to contract; if there is a
loss, the manager, staff, and workers remediate the loss out of the operator's personal
property and income and the staff's bonuses for that year, according to the same
contractually stipulated proportions.
So, the focus of the asset management responsibility system is fixing the
economic responsibility of the operator and through contract granting him
the managerial right in the enterprise. The right of manager is in fact
transferred from the independent right of enterprise property. All these
elements are embodied in the contract, the realization of which is protected
by law.
Is this form worth extending broadly? Can it be realized as effective?
Many scholars doubt the applicability and effectiveness of asset management
responsibility. Some hold that this system's focus is decentralization of power
and intensification of responsibility; therefore, "asset management
responsibility" is only about how to divide the same power into different
levels and not about throwing out the old concept of "monopolizing big
power, and dispersing little ones." Besides, under "asset management
responsibility," enterprise and adminstrative departments are connected
closely, and the policymaking in and operation of the social economy is under
the tight control (in the sense that evaluation relates to control) of the state
organization from the very beginning. This denies the economic function of
the enterprise and inhibits the chief mechanism of an enterprise commodity
economy. Therefore, it is hard to separate state and enterprise and to realize
the enterprise's independent property right.49
Others argue that the main defect of asset management responsibility is
the lack of a scientific basis for assessing of the assets of the enterprise.
Influenced by people's subjectivity, assessments hardly reflect the real
situation of the management and operation of the enterprise. It probably will
also provide a chance for some people to take advantage of the government
by embezzling, and disrupt normal social economic life. 50
This form has been experimented with in more than 100 enterprises in
over twenty cities including Shenyang, Zhongqing, Wuhan, Nanjing, and
Yantai. 5 1 From the experience of the experiments, this form of contract has a
positive significance. But problems exist and need to be explored in areas
such as choosing the operator, estimating the value of assets, converting
assets to stocks, and determining remuneration of the operator and
employees.
49. Luo Zhengfen, Dui zichanjingying zeren zhidudefansi (Second Thoughts on the Responsibility System of
Capital Management), JINGJI YANJIU (ECONOMIC RESEARCH), No. 11 (1986).
50. See Shi Qjanlong, Qiye gufenhua gaizao gouxiang (An Outline of the Transformation of Enterprises by
Securitization), Lilun xinxi bao (Theoretical News), Aug. 11, 1986, at 3.
51. Lilun xinxi bao (Theoretical News), Apr. 20, 1987, at I.
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PROPERTY RIGHTS OF STATE ENTERPRISES
Some people suggest different legal forms, such as trusteeship or agency,
for the enterprise to achieve the ownership of assets.5 2 The authors consider
that since the forms, situations, and environments of state enterprises vary, we
cannot tendentiously insist that they all adopt certain forms or choose and use
the forms without discussing if these fit the special situation of the enterprises.
The factual situation should be analyzed before adopting any forms. Besides
the stock form, the rest of the forms adopt the model of separating state
ownership and enterprise operation. These forms do not really give the
enterprises ownership and do not secure the enterprises' independent
position. The forms of lease, contract, and asset management responsibility
usually increase the antagonism between the manager and the employee
because these forms will increase the manager's authority and reduce the
employee's right to manage the enterprise democratically. If the operator has
the right to operate, and his inappropriate exercise of that right causes heavy
losses, perhaps to the point of bankruptcy, the employees' interests will surely
be adversely affected. It is unfair to let the employees to bear the con-
sequences.
Taking the needs of the vitalization of enterprises and the development of
the socialist commodities economy as the starting point, the property
relations between the state and enterprise should be handled by adopting
forms that separate the state's ownership right from the enterprise legal
person's ownership right. It means that the enterprise's ownership right must
first be established. Then part of the power and functions that inhere in the
enterprise legal person's ownership right must be separated and granted to
the enterprise legal person's lawful respresentative thereby separating within
the enterprise its ownership right from the operator's management right. By
adopting this form, the employee's enthusiasm can be mobilized and the
internal management system of the enterprise established and perfected.
Therefore, the authors think that compared with other forms, stockholding is
a possible avenue.
VI
CONCLUSION
China is a socialist state in which the means of production are publicly
owned. The ownership of the state-owned enterprise is an important problem
at present in the course of our economic reform. We can say that the
economic reform in the cities of the entire country is unfolding around this
key question. So the resolving of this question directly affects the progress
and results of the reform.
The property rights of enterprises in a system of ownership by the whole is
also an important theoretical question in our civil law that needs to be
resolved. In one passage of his History of Theory of Surplus Value, Karl Marx
52. Zhang Yi, Luehm guoyou qiye gaigedefangxiang (A Brief Discussion of the Direction of Reform of State-
owned Enterprises), Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), Dec. 6, 1986.
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approvingly quotes Montesquieu's famous statement that "the spirit of law is
ownership." Ownership is the key question not only in civil law but also in all
of law. As young Chinese scholars of law, we feel deeply the necessity to
integrate China's practice of reform and to articulate our views on the state's
ownership rights and the enterprise's property rights. We hope that
leglislators will give them some attention and consider them a small
contribution to reform. At the same time, we hope that foreign scholars will
give the authors unstinting advice.
